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 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 11-1934 
 ___________ 
 
 TERRY SIMONTON, JR., 
        Appellant 
 v. 
 
FRANKLIN TENNIS; BRIAN THOMPSON; ROBERT MARSH; D. WOODRING; 




 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
 (D.C. Civil No. 09-cv-0233) 
 District Judge:  Honorable Christopher C. Conner 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 
 or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
June 30, 2011 
 Before:  SLOVITER, JORDAN and GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judges 
 







 Terry Simonton, Jr., appeals from orders of the District Court (1) dismissing his 
claim against defendant Inmate Seaman, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B);   
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(2) granting the motion for partial judgment on the pleadings of defendants Jeffrey 
Rackovan, W. Williams, Cindy G. Watson, and D. Woodring; and (3) granting the 
motion for summary judgment of defendants Franklin Tennis, Brian Thompson, Robert 
Marsh, Sergeant Brian, and Lieutenant Graham.  Because the appeal presents no 
substantial question, we will summarily affirm. 
I. 
In February 2009, Simonton filed a civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C.  
§ 1983, alleging injuries sustained while he was incarcerated at SCI-Rockview in 
Bellefonte, Pennsylvania.
1
  Simonton alleged that on April 12, 2008, Sergeant Brian and 
Lieutenant Graham—both corrections officers at SCI-Rockview—antagonized and 
incited Inmate Seaman, who was apparently upset over being denied a visitor, which 
prompted Inmate Seaman to strike Simonton in the face.  Simonton received medical 
attention for his injuries, including ice packs and Tylenol.  After complaining of 
headaches and displaying black circles under his eyes days later, an X-ray was taken 
confirming that the blow from Inmate Seaman had broken Simonton‟s nose.  Simonton 
was prescribed pain medications.  According to Simonton, he has experienced hearing 
loss, headaches, and vision problems since the incident. 
Simonton specifically alleged that Sergeant Brian and Lieutenant Graham, as well 
as Tennis, Thompson, and Marsh, violated his Eighth Amendment rights in failing to 
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protect his safety.   He also alleged that Tennis, Thompson, and Marsh engaged in 
repeated cover-ups of prisoner assaults within SCI-Rockview.  Simonton further alleged 
that Tennis, Thompson, and Marsh, in addition to Rackovan, Williams, and Watson—the 
three grievance officers—failed to properly investigate his grievance claims.  Finally, 
Simonton alleged that Woodring denied him his right to review his medical records.  All 
defendants were sued in both their official and personal capacities. 
In an April 17, 2009 order, the District Court dismissed Inmate Seaman pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i).  Rackovan, Williams, Watson, and Woodring 
subsequently moved for partial judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  On January 22, 2010, the District Court granted that 
motion.  The remaining defendants—Tennis, Thompson, Marsh, Sergeant Brian, and 
Lieutenant Graham—then moved for summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure.  In a March 16, 2011 order, the District Court granted these 
defendants‟ motion for summary judgment.  Simonton appealed. 
II. 
We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.   We may summarily 
affirm a judgment of the District Court if the appeal does not raise a substantial question.  
3d Cir. LAR 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.  We may affirm on any basis supported by the record.  
Hedges v. Musco, 204 F.3d 109, 116 (3d Cir. 2000).  We are of course mindful that a pro 





In order to establish a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate that:  (1) the 
conduct complained of was committed by persons acting under color of state law; and (2) 
the conduct violated a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or laws of 
the United States.  Nicini v. Morra, 212 F.3d 798, 806 (3d Cir. 2000) (en banc). 
A.  Dismissal of the claim against Inmate Seaman 
 The District Court dismissed as frivolous Simonton‟s claims as to Inmate Seaman.  
See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i).  Our review of that dismissal is plenary.  Tourscher v. 
McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999).   
We affirm the District‟s order, as it properly concluded that Simonton cannot sue 
Inmate Seaman under § 1983 because he is not a state actor.  A review of Simonton‟s 
complaint reveals no allegations giving rise to a plausible inference that Inmate Seaman 
acted under color of state law or conspired with state actors to deny Simonton his 
constitutional rights.  See Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27-28 (1980) (“Private persons, 
jointly engaged with state officials in the challenged action, are acting „under color‟ of 
law for purposes of § 1983 actions.”).  Accordingly, Simonton cannot recover against 
Inmate Seaman under § 1983.  Great W. Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 
615 F.3d 159, 175-76 (3d Cir. 2010) (“To prevail on a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must 




B.  Grant of partial summary judgment on the pleadings as to defendants 
Rackovan, Williams, Watson, and Woodring 
We exercise plenary review over a district court‟s order granting a Rule 12(c) 
motion.  Sikirica v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 214, 219 (3d Cir. 2005).  In doing so, 
“we accept as true all of the allegations in the complaint and draw all reasonable 
inferences therefrom in favor of [the nonmovant].”  Consol. Rail Corp. v. Portlight, Inc., 
188 F.3d 93, 94 (3d Cir. 1999).  We will affirm only if “the movant clearly establishes 
there are no material issues of fact, and he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  
Sikirica, 416 F.3d at 220. 
Simonton claims that these defendants violated his constitutional rights in failing 
to investigate his grievances.  At the outset, it is important to note that access to prison 
grievance procedures is not a constitutionally-mandated right.  See Jones v. N.C. 
Prisoners‟ Labor Union, 433 U.S. 119, 138 (1977) (Burger, C.J., concurring) (“I do not 
suggest that the [prison grievance] procedures are constitutionally mandated”); Massey v. 
Helman, 259 F.3d 641, 647 (7th Cir. 2001) (collecting cases).  Simonton has not 
presented any evidence tending to show that Rackovan deprived him of any right.  A bare 
allegation of “rubber stamping” does not suffice to establish a cognizable constitutional 
violation.   Accordingly, the District Court correctly concluded that judgment on the 
pleadings was warranted on Simonton‟s failure to investigate grievances claim, as it 
concerned Rackovan. 
Further, a prison official‟s secondary review of an inmate‟s grievance or appeal is 
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not sufficient to demonstrate the personal involvement required to establish the 
deprivation of a constitutional right.  See Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207-08 
(3d Cir. 1988) (holding that a plaintiff must establish that the defendants “have personal 
involvement in the alleged wrongs [which] . . . can be shown through allegations of 
personal direction or of actual knowledge and acquiescence,” and noting that the 
governor‟s awareness of plaintiff‟s grievance filed with his office of administration is 
insufficient to establish personal involvement in, and actual knowledge of, the conduct 
complained of by plaintiff).  Additionally, “[a]llegations of participation or actual 
knowledge and acquiescence . . . must be made with appropriate particularity.”  Id. at 
1207 (emphasis added).  Simonton has not alleged Watson‟s knowledge and 
acquiescence with the required particularity; her mere review of Simonton‟s grievances is 
not sufficient.  Id.  Simonton has failed to show that Watson had the necessary personal 
involvement in the underlying unconstitutional conduct.  The District Court correctly 
concluded that judgment on the pleadings was warranted on Simonton‟s failure to 
investigate grievances claim, as it concerned Watson, Wilson, and Woodring.
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C.  Grant of summary judgment in favor of Tennis, Thompson, Marsh, Sergeant 
Brian, and Lieutenant Graham 
This Court exercises plenary review over the District Court‟s entry of summary 
judgment, Noel v. Boeing Co., 622 F.3d 266, 270 n.4 (3d Cir. 2010), viewing the  
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 Prior to disposition, Simonton conceded that he had no valid claims against Woodring 
and Williams.  (Dist. Ct. Mem. of January 22, 2010, pg. 2.) 
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underlying facts and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the 
non-moving party.  See Ray v. Twp. of Warren, 626 F.3d 170, 173 (3d Cir. 2010).  An 
order granting summary judgment is appropriate when the evidence reveals there is “no 
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).  “A genuine issue of material fact exists if there is 
sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that 
party.”  Spence v. ESAB Group, Inc., 623 F.3d 212, 216 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Anderson 
v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986)). 
1.  Conspiracy Claim 
The District Court properly granted summary judgment to Tennis, Thompson, and 
Marsh on Simonton‟s conspiracy claim.  In order to sufficiently allege a claim of civil 
rights conspiracy, the complaint must specifically set forth:  (1) the conduct that violated 
the plaintiff‟s rights; (2) the time and the place of the conduct; and (3) the identity of the 
officials responsible for the conduct.  See Oatess v. Sobolevitch, 914 F.2d 428, 431 n.8 
(3d Cir. 1990) (citing Colburn v. Upper Darby Twp., 838 F.2d 663, 666 (3d Cir. 1998)).  
Furthermore, the allegations of conspiracy must be grounded firmly in facts; they cannot 
be conclusory nor can they hinge on bare suspicions and foundationless speculation.  See 
Young v. Kann, 926 F.2d 1396, 1405 n.16 (3d Cir. 1991) (affirming dismissal of 
conspiracy claims based upon mere suspicion and speculation). 
We agree with the District Court that there is no evidence in the record to 
demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact to sustain a claim of conspiracy.  Besides the 
8 
 
generically broad allegations of a “cover up,” Simonton fails to allege specific facts 
detailing the conduct involved and the timeframe.  Nor does he present facts that 
remotely suggest concerted activity.  The District Court thus correctly concluded that 
summary judgment was warranted on Simonton‟s conspiracy claim. 
2.  Failure to Investigate Grievances Claim 
 The District Court properly granted summary judgment to Tennis, Thompson, and 
Marsh on Simonton‟s claim of failure to investigate grievances.  As noted above, access 
to prison grievance procedures is not a constitutionally-mandated right.  Jones, 433 U.S. 
at 138 (Burger, C.J., concurring); Massey, 259 F.3d at 647.  Simonton‟s claim is further 
undermined by his failure to allege knowledge and acquiescence with the required 
particularity.  See Rode, 845 F.2d at 1208.  Simonton‟s general assertion that Tennis, 
Thompson, and Marsh occupy supervisory roles is not sufficient to demonstrate that their 
secondary review of an inmate‟s grievance or appeal establishes the deprivation of a 
constitutional right.  Simonton has thus failed to show that these defendants had the 
necessary personal involvement to sustain a cognizable § 1983 claim.  Accordingly, the 
District Court correctly concluded that summary judgment was warranted on Simonton‟s 
failure to investigate grievances claim. 
3.  Failure to Protect Claim 
The District Court properly granted summary judgment to Tennis, Thompson, and 
Marsh on Simonton‟s Eighth Amendment failure to protect claim.  This claim rests upon 
the nature of their supervisory roles in SCI-Rockview.  To establish an action for 
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supervisory liability, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the supervising officials:  (1) 
personally participated in violating a person‟s rights; (2) directed others to violate a 
person‟s rights; or (3) had knowledge of and acquiesced in a subordinate‟s violations of a 
person‟s rights.  Robinson v. City of Pittsburgh, 120 F.3d 1286, 1293 (3d Cir. 1997), 
abrogated on other grounds by Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 
76-78 (2006).  We agree with the District Court that Simonton has failed to put forth any 
facts suggesting that Tennis, Thompson, or Marsh participated in unconstitutional 
activity, directed others to do so, or had knowledge of and acquiesced in a subordinate‟s 
unconstitutional conduct. 
Likewise, the District Court properly granted summary judgment to Sergeant 
Brian and Lieutenant Graham on Simonton‟s Eighth Amendment failure to protect claim.  
Among their many duties, prisoner officials are charged with taking “reasonable 
measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates,”  Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 
(1994) (quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526-27 (1984)), which includes 
protecting “prisoners from violence at the hands of other prisoners.”  Hamilton v. Leavy, 
117 F.3d 742, 746 (3d Cir. 1997) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 833).  
Not all injuries inflicted upon one prisoner by another equate to an Eighth 
Amendment violation on the part of prison officials.  Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834.  To 
establish an Eighth Amendment failure to protect claim, a plaintiff must show that:  (1) 
he is “incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm;” and (2) 
prison officials operated with “deliberate indifference to [his] health and safety.”  Id.; see 
10 
 
also Beers-Capitol v. Whetzel, 256 F.3d 120, 125 (3d Cir. 2001).  Deliberate indifference 
is proven by showing that an official “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to 
inmate health or safety.”  Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837.  Not only must a prison official be 
“aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious 
harm exists,” but the official “must also draw the inference.”  Id. 
We agree with the District Court that Simonton has failed to demonstrate genuine 
issues of material fact to establish an Eighth Amendment violation.  First, there is not the 
slightest indication from Simonton‟s complaint or statement of facts that he was 
incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm.  This prong 
generally cannot be met by allegations of a single incident.  See Riley v. Jeffes, 777 F.2d 
143, 147 (3d Cir. 1985).  There is no evidence that prior to this incident Simonton was 
subject to threats, abuses, or danger at SCI-Rockview.  Simonton even discloses that 
Inmate Seaman was previously irate when he began talking with Lieutenant Graham, and 
all of the evidence points to the conclusion that the attack by Inmate Seaman occurred 
without forewarning; in particular, it was unanticipated by Simonton as well as Sergeant 
Brian and Lieutenant Graham.   
As to the second prong, there is absolutely no evidence offered by Simonton 
indicating that Sergeant Brian and Lieutenant Graham acted with the requisite culpable 
state of mind:  deliberate indifference to Simonton‟s health and safety.    Simonton 
presents no evidence tending to show that Sergeant Brian and Lieutenant Graham knew 
and consciously disregarded the risk that Inmate Seaman would channel his anger by 
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striking Simonton in the face.  The District Court thus correctly concluded that summary 
judgment was warranted on Simonton‟s Eighth Amendment failure to protect claim. 
IV. 
 For the reasons given in this opinion, we will summarily affirm the judgment of 
the District Court.  
